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Abstract 
 
Wealthy individuals often voluntarily provide public goods that the poor also consume.  
Such philanthropy is commonly perceived as legitimizing one’s wealth.  Governments 
routinely exempt the rich from taxation on grounds of their charitable expenditures.  We 
examine the logic of this exemption.  We show that, rather than reducing inequality, 
philanthropy may actually exacerbate absolute inequality, while leaving the change in 
relative inequality ambiguous. Additionally, philanthropic preferences may increase the 
effectiveness of policies to redistribute income, instead of weakening them.  Consequently, 
from an egalitarian perspective, the general case for exempting the wealthy from 
expropriation, on grounds of their public goods contributions, appears dubious.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Andrew Mellon had been accused of being tardy in his tax payments.  In 1937, Mellon 
decided to build the National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C., donating his private art 
collection to it.  The Roosevelt administration lowered its tax demands.  Should it instead 
have forced Mellon to pay up?1     
The question is general.  Rich individuals often voluntarily contribute large 
amounts towards the provision of public goods that are intrinsically important for the well-
being of individuals, but have limited impact on their incomes.  Examples of such public 
goods that routinely acquire rich patrons include places of worship, ethnic festivals, literary 
and cultural activities, sports clubs, civic/neighborhood amenities (including parks, 
museums, theatres, community halls, libraries), facilities for scientific research, etc.  Poor 
individuals who share some intrinsic extra-economic characteristic (typically religion, 
ethnicity, language, race or residential location) with such rich patrons can benefit from 
these public goods without having to incur any major expenditure.  Indeed, one may think 
of these ‘local’ public goods as instrumental in creating ties that build a ‘community’ out of 
an economically heterogeneous group of individuals who share some extra-economic 
characteristic (Dasgupta and Kanbur (2006)).   
 Faced with a particular income distribution, suppose one agreed, for some 
normative reason, to support redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, if the rich 
were to spend all their earnings on private consumption.  Should such a person then oppose 
redistribution if the rich spent part of their earnings on public consumption instead?  To put 
the matter differently, if one is convinced that the income rights that the rich claim in the 
status quo are illegitimate when exercised solely for private purposes, should one then 
consider them legitimate when they are exercised partly for public purposes?  Should the 
use to which private fortune is voluntarily put have any bearing on its acceptability? 
There appears to be a surprising degree of consensus across the political spectrum 
that it should.  An important strand of conservative political thought seeks to legitimize 
large inequalities in income or wealth by emphasizing public functions performed by 
                                                 
1  It is widely suggested that a deal was struck.  Since then, Federal and State governments in the U.S. have come to 
encourage the wealthy to donate art to reduce tax liability as a matter of policy.  See D’Arcy (2002). 
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private wealth.  At ethical, programmatic and propagandist levels, political formations on 
the right typically counter-pose ‘duty’ to ‘justice’, or private charity to large-scale 
redistribution.2  Even governments on the left routinely provide large tax deductions for 
charitable contributions.  Thus, even avowed egalitarians reveal a marked preference for 
compromise with inequality, conditional on the willingness of the wealthy to compromise 
their selfishness.3   
In recent years, this policy thrust has also become prominent in many developing 
countries.  The earlier emphasis on state-organized redistribution of income and wealth has 
largely been supplanted by attempts to encourage the rich to voluntarily contribute to local 
public goods.  While tax rates have been brought down and land reforms abandoned, 
private and corporate sponsorship for the provision and maintenance of local public goods 
is being increasingly encouraged.  The explosive proliferation of charity intermediation 
professionals in developing countries is in part a reflection of this process. 
Having decided, for whatever reason, to expropriate the selfish rich, exactly why 
should consistent egalitarians spare the selfless ones?  One possible argument is that any 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, by reducing the supply of public goods, 
would actually make the poor worse off.  However, this argument obviously lacks general 
validity: greater inequality is not necessarily Pareto-improving.4  A more plausible case 
may however be constructed along the following lines.  Standard measurement of 
inequality typically concentrates on the distribution of consumption expenditure.  If the rich 
spend much of their income on public goods that are also consumed by the poor, standard 
inequality measures would overstate inequality in the distribution of welfare.  Thus, ‘civic-
mindedness’ on part of the rich would (at least partially) counteract inequality in access to 
income or wealth.  Since inequality in the distribution of welfare would be significantly 
less than inequality in income or wealth in the status quo, the case for prioritizing equality 
                                                 
2  Benjamin Disraeli, the leading Conservative ideologue of 19th century Britain, argued that “the tenure of property 
should be the fulfillment of duty” (Scruton (2001, p.109)).  Thus, Disraeli’s position, which echoed a core ethical 
principle of feudalism, justified wealth inequality provided the rich performed social functions, i.e., generated public 
goods in a broad sense, but not otherwise.  A similar idea underlies the Gandhian view of property-ownership as 
trusteeship, as well as much of Catholic and Islamic social thought.  Traditional political hierarchies in many developing 
countries continue to base much of their ideological appeal on such notions of public function. 
3  One may also commonly notice this trend in public perception of rich individuals.  Andrew Carnegie is 
remembered today far more for his philanthropy than for his ruthless union-busting and competition-restricting business 
practices.  Having made his money in Africa through methods many contemporaries (quite reasonably) considered 
criminal, Cecil Rhodes bought himself respectability through his charitable munificence. 
4  See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2006), Cornes and Sandler (2000), and Nozick (1974, pp. 265-268). 
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over other values (e.g. individual freedom, self-ownership, respect for property rights, 
social stability) would be accordingly weakened.  Furthermore, the income gain that the 
poor would make from a given redistribution would be largely negated by the adverse 
impact on their welfare from a reduction in public good provision by the rich.  Thus, a 
given reduction in income inequality would actually entail a far lower reduction in welfare 
inequality.  Philanthropy would reduce the marginal gain from redistribution (in terms of 
reduction of welfare inequality), to an extent that the latter would be outweighed by the 
marginal cost of redistribution (say, in terms of infringement of individual freedom, self-
ownership and property rights).5
If correct, this argument would constitute a plausible and important objection to 
egalitarian policy interventions, one which egalitarians themselves might find persuasive.  
Thus, a rigorous examination of this claim, from a broad egalitarian perspective, is of 
considerable interest.  Exactly how does a given pattern of inequality in incomes translate 
into inequality in welfare outcomes, when mediated through private charity, in the sense of 
voluntary public goods provision by the rich?  Is the latter inequality necessarily lower than 
the former?  Is a given redistribution of income necessarily less effective in reducing 
welfare inequality when the rich voluntarily provide public goods?  The purpose of this 
paper is to examine these issues.6  The thrust of the literature on voluntary provision of 
public goods has been on investigating how (income) inequality affects voluntary 
provision.7  Our focus is on addressing the exact opposite question: how voluntary 
provision affects (welfare) inequality. 
We model a community in terms of a game of voluntary contributions to a public 
good, among agents with identical preferences, who vary in terms of their personal 
incomes.  In the Nash equilibrium, all rich agents contribute to the public good, while all 
non-rich individuals completely free-ride.  As in standard measurement of inequality, we 
                                                 
5  “The egalitarian … will defend taking from some to give to others, … on grounds of “justice”.  At this point, 
equality comes sharply into conflict with freedom; one must choose” Friedman (1974, p.195).  Nevertheless, the rate at 
which a pragmatic egalitarian would choose to trade away freedom for equality can reasonably be expected to depend on 
her assessment of the relative mix of freedom and equality in the status quo, and of the marginal impact of redistribution 
on equality.  See Section 2 for a formalization.    
6  Community–mediation of income inequality, through voluntary contributions to local, or community-specific, 
‘club’ goods is also likely to have important implications for distributive conflicts among economic classes and identity 
groups, as well as for organizing measures to combat poverty.  On these themes, see, respectively, Dasgupta and Kanbur 
(2006, 2005a, 2005b).   
7  See Cornes and Sandler (1996) for an overview. 
 4
wish to focus on a money-metric measure of welfare outcomes.  However, since 
individuals can freely access the public good contributions of others, their personal 
earnings can no longer provide such a measure.  Instead, we utilize the standard notion of 
equivalent variation to develop a money-metric measure of welfare outcomes that 
incorporates the benefits of the public good.  Inequality in welfare outcomes is then 
measured in terms of pair-wise gaps in such ‘real’, or ‘equivalent’ incomes, instead of 
differences in personal incomes.  Aggregation of absolute gaps leads to absolute measures 
of inequality, while aggregation of the gaps normalized by the average or the maximum of 
the income distribution leads to relative measures of inequality.  
We show that, under standard restrictions on preferences, the following must be 
true.  The mediation of philanthropy makes the absolute gap in real (or welfare) outcomes 
between two non-contributory members larger than that in their nominal incomes.  Thus, 
philanthropy exacerbates the welfare consequences of income inequalities among the non-
rich.  If the non-rich are sufficiently poorer than the rich, this is true of the gap between 
rich and non-rich individuals as well.  Thus, according to absolute measures of inequality, 
the community may in fact be made more unequal, rather than less, by philanthropy.  This 
result is driven essentially by the fact that any given amount of the public good is worth 
less to the poorer individual.  Thus, our results suggest that absolute inequality egalitarians 
should maintain an attitude of strong skepticism vis-à-vis the claim of equality-
enhancement via philanthropy. We also show that the result with relative inequality 
measures is ambiguous — even here, there can be no guarantee that philanthropy reduces 
inequality. We then show that a given, efficient, redistribution of monetary income may 
reduce absolute inequality in real outcomes more, rather than less, when the rich contribute 
to the public good.  The same may also hold for relative inequality.  Hence, egalitarians 
should also cultivate agnosticism regarding the claim that philanthropy on part of the rich 
makes income redistribution less effective in reducing welfare inequality. 
Section 2 formalizes, and thereby further clarifies, the intuitive argument we seek to 
contest.  Section 3 lays out the basic model.  Section 4 presents our results regarding the 
relationship between inequality in personal incomes and inequality in welfare outcomes.  
We discuss the effects of nominal redistribution on real inequality in Section 5.  Section 6 
discusses some extensions.  Section 7 concludes. 
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 2. Formalizing the Questions 
 
We first formalize the intuitive motivation for our analysis discussed in Section 1.  To fix 
ideas, suppose a rich individual with income, say, $100, is allowed to keep only $50, post-
tax, when her entire consumption is private.  However, if she reports some charitable 
contribution, she receives a tax concession.  Her taxable income is now assessed at less 
than $100, so that she ends up paying less than $50 in taxes, thus keeping more than $50.  
Why should she be allowed to do so?  
 To examine this question somewhat more rigorously, we first require a formal set-
up.  Consider a community consisting of  individuals.  Individual i has monetary 
income .  Let  be the maximum monetary income in the community: all 
individuals who earn this amount will be termed rich.  Each individual derives utility from 
the consumption of a private good and a public good.  All rich individuals voluntarily 
provide some amount of the public good.  However, no other individual (i.e., no individual 
with income less than ) does so.  Thus, non-rich individuals completely free-ride on the 
public good provision of the rich.  If, somehow, the public good were to turn exclusive, so 
that individuals lost access to contributions by others, i would need a nominal income of  
to be as well off as before.  Thus,  is the ‘real’, or ‘equivalent’ income of individual i.  
Let  be, respectively, the nominal and real income distribution vector in the status 
quo. 
2≥n
{ }niI i ,...,2,1, ∈ CI
CI
ir
ir
00 , rI
Suppose now a social planner is considering whether to impose a tax t on every rich 
individual, and distribute the proceeds among the non-rich according to some (given) 
sharing rule.  She chooses to measure income inequality according to some measure 
, or , reflective of her prior ethical intuition regarding inequality.  
Taxes impose some cost according to the increasing function 
( )nIIe ,...,1 ( nrre ,...,1 )
( )tF , whereas inequality 
imposes some cost according to the strictly convex and increasing function .  The 
social planner would support a marginal redistribution at the status quo if it reduces 
, a, b >0, where a and b are the relevant weights in the social welfare 
( )eE
( )( )[ bFreaE + ]
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function.  A marginal redistribution would reduce inequality of nominal incomes by some 
positive amount , and inequality of real incomes by IeΔ reΔ .  Since the tax on the rich 
would reduce their spending on the public good, IeΔ  need not be equal to . reΔ
Suppose that ( ) ( )( )[ ]IeIeEaFb Δ′<′ 0,0 0 .  Then, if all consumption in society were 
private, the social planner would support the imposition of a tax on the rich at the margin in 
the status quo.  Notice now that, if ( ) ( )0,0, 00 reIe > , and rI ee Δ≥Δ , then 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ]rI ereEeIeE Δ′>Δ′ 0,0, 00 .  Thus, if philanthropy makes real inequality lower than 
nominal inequality at the status quo, and additionally reduces the effectiveness of income 
redistribution in addressing real inequality, the social planner who advocates redistribution 
when the rich are selfish need not do so when the rich happen to be philanthropic.   
This, then, is the simple formal specification of the argument we wish to critique.  
We shall show in subsequent sections that neither of the two priors in this argument need 
hold, in general.  
 
3.  The Model 
 
Our first step is to model the provision of the public good.  Let a community consist of 
 individuals.  The set of individuals is3≥n { }n,...,1N = .  Each individual consumes a 
private good and a public good.  For any Ni∈ ,  is the amount of the private good 
consumed,  is the amount of the public good provided by i herself, whereas  is the 
amount of the public good provided by all other agents.  Preferences are given by a strictly 
quasi-concave and twice continuously differentiable utility function 
ix
iy iy−
( )ii Bxu , , where 
iii yyB −+≡ θ , ( ]1,0∈θ .  Thus, agents may be concerned only with the total amount of the 
public good.  This possibility, the so-called ‘pure’ public good (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 
(1996), Bergstrom et al. (1986)) case, implies 1=θ .  The public good may also be 
‘impure’ - agents may derive greater utility from an additional unit of the public good if 
they themselves provide it (e.g. Andreoni (1990), Cornes and Sandler (1994)), say because 
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of the ‘warm glow’ from the act of giving.  In this case 10 <<θ .8  We assume agents have 
identical preferences.   
 Agent  has own money (or nominal) income, Ni∈ [ ]Ci II ,0∈ .  Thus, the highest 
income in the community is ++ℜ∈CI .  Let { }Ci IINiC =∈= | , CnCn => .  Thus, C is 
the set of rich members of the community; who all earn ; the community contains  
such individuals.  The community also contains some non-rich individuals, who earn less 
than .  Define , and let 
CI Cn
CI [ CNP \= ] { }PiII iP ∈= |max .  Thus, P is the set of non-rich 
individuals, i.e., all individuals who earn less than ; CI PI  is the second-highest income 
level in the community.   
 Community members simultaneously choose the allocation of their expenditure 
between the two goods.9  For notational simplicity, we shall assume that all prices are 
unity.  Thus, incomes in our analysis are all implicitly price-deflated.  A community 
member’s maximization problem then is the following. 
( iiBx BxuMaxii ,, )  subject to the budget constraint: 
iiii yIBx −+=+ θ ,                                                                                                                          
(3.1) 
and the additional constraint: 
ii yB −≥ θ .                                                                                                                                          
(3.2) 
The solution to the maximization problem, subject to the budget constraint (3.1) alone, 
yields, in the standard way, the unrestricted demand functions: ( )[ ]iii yIgB −+= θ , and 
( )[ ]iii yIhx −+= θ .   
 Our main assumptions are the following. 
                                                 
8  The lower the value of θ , the stronger the marginal ‘warm glow’ benefit from giving.  Preferences can also be 
equivalently represented by , where y is the total amount of the public good, and ( yyxU ii ,, ) yUyUi ∂∂∂∂  is some non-
negative constant, this term being 0 for the pure public good case.  Lower values of θ  evidently correspond to higher 
values of y
U
y
U
i ∂
∂
∂
∂ . 
9  Individuals sometimes contribute time, rather than money, towards public goods.  So long as time contributions 
can be substituted by purchased inputs, including labour, such contributions are formally equivalent to monetary 
contributions.  See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005b). 
 8
A1.  . 0, >′′ hg
A2.  [ ] ( ) ∞=+ −∞→+ − iiyI yIhLtii θθ . 
A1 is the assumption that all goods are normal.  By A1, there must exist a unique and 
symmetric Nash equilibrium in the voluntary contributions game.10  In any Nash 
equilibrium, it must be the case that: 
([ )iiii yIgyB −− += ]θ θ,max N for all i∈ .                                                                                   
(3.3) 
A2 implies that demand function for the private good is unbounded from above, i.e., one 
can generate any arbitrary level of demand for the private good by suitably choosing the 
nominal income level.11  
 Agent i is non-contributory in a Nash equilibrium if and only if, in that Nash 
equilibrium, ([ iii yIgy −− +> )]θθ , and contributory otherwise.  By a non-contributory 
agent, we thus mean one who, given total contribution by others, would prefer to convert 
some of the public good contributions by other agents into her own private consumption, if 
she could do so.  Since agents cannot divert other people’s contributions into their own 
private consumption (3.2), non-contributory agents choose to spend nothing on the public 
good.  Given total contribution by others, contributory agents, however, would not wish to 
reduce their spending on the public good, even if they could do so.  Given any 0>−iyθ , by 
A1, ([ ii ygy −− > )]θθ ; thus, agents with income sufficiently close to 0 must be non-
contributory.  
 As discussed earlier, our interest lies in a situation where, in the Nash equilibrium, 
the rich contribute to the public good, whereas the non-rich free-ride.  We ensure this by 
assuming ( ) ( )([ CPC IgIgIg θθ +> )]
                                                
.  Intuitively, this implies all non-rich agents earn so 
much less than the rich that the former are all non-contributory even when there is only one 
rich individual in the community.  It is easy to check that, given A1, this suffices to ensure 
that only the rich, i.e. agents belonging to the set C, will ever be contributory in the Nash 
 
10  See Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and Andreoni (1990). 
11  For convenience of exposition: we only need the upper bound on h to be greater than . CI
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equilibrium, regardless of the number of rich individuals.  We shall denote the contribution 
of a rich individual by ; thus, in the Nash equilibrium, Cy CC yny = .   
 Due to philanthropy on part of the rich, individual Ni∈  acquires consumption 
access to  amount of the community’s public good.  A natural way to measure the 
monetary value of this gain is in terms of the standard notion of equivalent variation, i.e., 
in terms of the additional money she would need to achieve the same utility, if she did not 
have this access.
iy−
12  Let the real income of agent i in a Nash equilibrium, where she 
consumes ( , be defined as: )ii Bx , ( ) ( )( )[ ]iiii BxuVBxr ,, 1−≡ ; where V  is the indirect utility 
function. Thus, if all consumption were somehow privatized, i would be as well off as 
before only if she is given an additional ( )[ ]iii IBxr −,  dollars, over her own nominal 
income .  Evidently, an agent would be better off in one Nash equilibrium rather than 
another, if, and only if, her real income is higher in the former.  We define: 
iI
( ) ( ) ( )[ iiiiii BxryIyIf ,,, 1 −+≡ −−− θθθ ] .                                                                                    
(3.4)                                                                            
The function f  provides the monetary equivalent of the welfare loss generated by the in-
kind, rather than cash, nature of philanthropy.  When all other agents together spend  on 
the public good, it is as if i receives a transfer, in kind, of that amount of the public good.  
When i is contributory, the public good contribution by all other agents is evidently 
equivalent, in terms of its effect on i's welfare, to a cash transfer of 
iy−
iy−θ .  The equivalent 
variation is therefore simply iy−θ .  However, when i is non-contributory, the in-kind nature 
of the transfer generates a welfare loss.  The equivalent variation in this case is 
consequently less than iy−θ .  Recall that an agent is non-contributory if and only if Pi II < .  
Thus, money value of the individual gain from philanthropy is the equivalent variation 
( )[ .fy i −− ]θ ; where: 
( ) 0f =.  if , and Ci II = ( ) ( )iy0f −∈ ,.  if ( ]Pi II ,0∈ .                                                                
(3.5)         
                                                 
12  For a related approach to measuring individual gains from public good provision, see Cornes (1996).  The 
questions we address are however quite different. 
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 Consider now a non-rich (and thus, non-contributory) agent.  For such an agent, 
how does the gain from philanthropy, i.e., the equivalent variation, change with changes in 
(a) the agent’s own (nominal) income, and (b) the magnitude of public good provision by 
rich agents?   
 Lemma 3.1.  Given A1, if ( ]Pi II ,0∈ , then: (i) ( )1,0∈−iyf , (ii) , and (iii) 
, . 
0<
iI
f
0<− ii Iyf 0>ii IIf
 Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 By Lemma 3.1, an additional dollar of public good provision is worth a positive 
amount, but less than θ , of cash income to non-contributory individuals.  Their valuation 
of a given amount of the public good, and of an additional dollar of it, both rise with their 
cash income. The former rises at a decreasing rate.  
 Lastly, the total amount of the public good provided by the rich must increase as the 
rich become more numerous.  However, individual contributions must fall as the number of 
rich individuals increases. 
Lemma 3.2.  Given A1-A2, the Nash equilibrium level of the public good, y, is 
increasing in , while  is decreasing in , with  .   Cn Cy Cn 0=∞→ CC yn
Lt
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
4.  Inequality  
 
In our community, rich members provide collective goods, whereas the non-rich free-ride.  
Does this imply that an egalitarian should consider the distribution of real income within 
the community less unequal than that of nominal income?  To address this question, one 
needs to first choose a measure of inequality: a choice that is inescapably value-laden 
(Kolm (1976), Sen (1997)).  Which class of inequality measures should an egalitarian opt 
for?  The presence of the public good, in effect, generates some additional income.  There 
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are two common views in the literature on what distribution of this increment would leave 
inequality unchanged.  From one point of view, inequality remains unchanged if and only if 
this additional income is divided equally.  Thus, one should opt for absolute inequality 
measures, i.e., inequality measures that aggregate absolute income gaps.  This perspective 
appears to correspond closely with egalitarian intuition regarding inequality.  Indeed, it was 
precisely this idea that led Kolm (1976) to coin the term ‘leftist’ to characterize such 
measures of inequality.  Standard examples of absolute measures are the variance and the 
Kolm absolute measure.13  From the other point of view, inequality is unchanged if the 
increment is divided in proportion to current income.  Kolm (1976) coined the term 
‘rightist’ for this perspective, which leads to the adoption of relative inequality measures, 
i.e., inequality measures that aggregate relative income gaps — specifically, income gaps 
normalized by either the average or the maximum of the distribution.  Standard examples 
of relative measures include the Gini measure of inequality. 
 Let the real income gap between individuals j and l in the Nash equilibrium be 
denoted by , and let  denote the corresponding nominal income gap.  Using (3.4), 
we can write: 
jlR jlM
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]jjlljljljl yIfyIfyyMR −− −+−+= ,,θθ ,                                                                   
(4.1) 
where  denotes the Nash equilibrium contribution by j and jy jj yyy −≡−  denotes total 
Nash equilibrium contribution by all agents other than j;  are defined analogously. ll yy −,
 Proposition 4.1.  Let A1 hold.  Let Π  be the set of all { },...2,1∈∗n  which satisfy the 
following: for every , there exists ∗> nnC ( ) ( )( )CC IgnI ,0~ ∈  such that, if ( Cl nII )~< , then 
[ ]jljl MR >  for .  Then the following must be true.   ( ) PClj ×∈,
(i) For all  such that ,( ) PPlj ×∈, 0>jlM [ ]jljl MR > . 
(ii) If A2 holds, or if , ( ) ( )[ 0,0,0 uyu = ] Π  is non-empty. 
(iii) If ,( ) ( )[ ]0,0,0 uyu = ( ) 1min =Π . 
 Proof:  See the Appendix. 
                                                 
13  Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (1998) show that these two are the only absolute decomposable inequality 
measures that satisfy some other standard properties. 
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 First consider the non-contributory (i.e. non-rich) segment of the community.  By 
Proposition 4.1(i), the real gap between every pair of individuals belonging to this segment 
is higher than the corresponding nominal gaps.  Intuitively, this happens because the public 
good is worth more to wealthier individuals.  Thus, the public good technology magnifies 
nominal gaps within the non-rich section of the community.   
 How do nominal and real gaps compare between the rich and the others?  
Contradictory effects are at work here.  A rich individual, say k, benefits all non-rich 
individuals through her spending on the public good.  Since the non-rich do not contribute, 
the nominal income gap will necessarily overstate the real income gap between k and any 
non-rich individual if k is the only rich person in the community.  However, when the 
community also contains other rich individuals, k will benefit more than the non-rich from 
public spending by such individuals.  Proposition 4.1(ii) implies that, above some threshold 
number of rich individuals, the second effect will dominate the first, whenever the non-rich 
individuals have sufficiently low nominal incomes.  Thus, whenever the number of rich 
individuals is above this threshold, one cannot rule out the possibility that the nominal 
income gap will understate the true magnitude of differences in real income between the 
rich and the others.14  If the public good is worthless when one has zero nominal income,15 
an additional, but intuitively reasonable, assumption, such understatement can occur in 
every community with more than one rich individual (Proposition 4.1(iii)).   
 Notice that the assumption that private consumption is unbounded from above (A2) 
plays a rather minor role in our results.  It is not required to support the claim that, between 
two non-rich individuals, philanthropy makes real inequality greater than nominal 
inequality (Proposition 4.1(ii)).  Nor is it required to support the corresponding claim for 
the gap between a rich and a non-rich individual, provided the public good is worthless 
when one has no nominal income (Proposition 4.1(iii)). 
                                                 
14  The basic point is that, Bill Gates, for example, attains a larger hike in real income from the $31 billion donation 
to the Gates Foundation by Warren Buffet, than the average American who values the Gates-Buffet objective of poverty 
alleviation in developing countries, but not enough to contribute.  Consequently, Buffet’s donation may make real 
inequality between Gates and this average American higher than the nominal inequality. 
15  Intuitively, this captures the idea that, at the edge of survival, the public good has a negligible impact on the 
individual’s well-being.  Formally, multiplicative functional forms such as the Cobb-Douglas imply this property.    
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 Since 
( ) ( )ii j ji zVarn
zz ≡−∑ ∑ 2
2
2
, Proposition 4.1 immediately yields the 
following. 
 Corollary 4.2.  Let A1 hold.  Then, if A2 holds, or if ( ) ( )[ ]0,0,0 uyu = , there exists 
 such that, in every community with more than rich individuals, the 
distribution of nominal income exhibits a lower variance than that of real income when 
{ ,...2,1∈∗n } ∗n
PI  
is sufficiently close to 0.  When ( ) ( )[ 0,0,0 uyu ]= , this is true for every community with at 
least two rich individuals. 
 Thus, Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 run counter to the view that voluntary 
public spending by the rich necessarily compensates for prior inequalities in income or 
wealth.  Our results show that, in general, wealthier individuals are likely to benefit more 
from such contributions.  Consequently, the distribution of real income within the 
community may be more (absolutely) unequal than that of nominal income, rather than 
less, according to a measure that, arguably, should appear natural to egalitarians.   
 Absolute measures of inequality violate the property of scale invariance.  Scale 
invariance requires that equal-proportion changes in all incomes should leave the inequality 
measure invariant.  Both normative and pragmatic considerations are invoked to justify this 
property.  The normative, ‘rightist’, a priori position appears to contradict egalitarian 
intuition.  The pragmatic justification is based on the idea that inequality rankings should 
not change when all incomes are measured in a different unit, say pounds rather than 
dollars.  Since our analysis is based on price-deflated incomes, this consideration is not 
germane to our conclusions.  Notice nevertheless that the variance is ‘unit consistent’: 
inequality rankings between different distributions are unaffected by equal-proportion 
changes in all incomes, though the Kolm measure is not (Zheng (2005)).  Thus, our claim, 
that the real distribution may be more unequal than the nominal one (Corollary 4.2), is 
unaffected by the additional restriction that the inequality measure that accords with 
egalitarian intuition used should also satisfy unit consistency. 
 Relative measures of inequality incorporate the property of scale invariance.  It can 
be shown that pair-wise real inequality between the rich and the non-rich will, in general 
(though not always), be less than the corresponding nominal inequality under such 
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measures.16  Thus, ‘rightists’ should, on a priori ethical grounds, choose inequality 
measures that are likely to lead them to conclude that real inequality is lower than nominal 
inequality.  Hence, a priori ‘rightists’ are likely to perceive their case against redistribution 
as strengthened by philanthropy, in marked contrast to a priori ‘leftists’.  However, as 
already discussed, the normative case for using relative measures does not appear stronger 
than that for absolute measures.  Intermediate, ‘centrist’ measures have also been discussed 
(e.g. Bossert and Pfingsten (1990)).  Our conclusions will hold for particular 
parameterizations of these measures. 
 
5.   Real Effects of Nominal Redistribution 
 
It remains to address the issue of effectiveness of nominal redistribution in reducing 
inequality when the rich provide public goods.  Even if philanthropy actually exacerbates 
welfare inequality, rather than attenuating it, a marginal redistribution of nominal income 
from the rich to others will induce the former to reduce their spending on the public good.  
Thus, the redistribution will directly increase real incomes of the non-rich, but the cutback 
in public good provision by the rich will reduce them.  What would be the net effect on 
inequality?  Does philanthropy by the rich necessarily make redistribution of nominal 
income less effective in reducing inequality?  We now show that there should not be a 
general presumption in favor of this view.  Depending on preferences and the initial 
nominal distribution, a marginal redistribution of nominal income may in fact turn out to 
have a greater inequality-reducing impact on the real distribution than the nominal one, in 
                                                 
16  For example, suppose that 
i
i
x
B
 does not increase along the income expansion path.  Homothetic preferences are 
evidently a special case of this restriction.  Then, as can be easily checked, for every ( ) PClj ×∈, , 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ >
j
l
j
l
I
I
r
r
.  
This in turn yields: ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+>+ jl
l
jl
l
II
I
rr
r
.  Thus, expressed as a proportion of a rich person’s income, or as a 
proportion of mean income, pair-wise nominal inequality between the rich and the non-rich is always greater than the 
corresponding real inequality in this case.  This conclusion however need not hold for preferences where 
i
i
x
B
 increases 
along the income expansion path.   
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addition to making the poor better off.  Thus, philanthropic preferences may make 
redistribution more effective in reducing inequality, rather than less. 
 We establish our claim by means of an example.  Let preferences be given by the 
symmetric Cobb-Douglas form , and suppose yxi 2≥= CnP .  Thus, the number of rich 
individuals is identical to that of non-rich individuals.  In line with our earlier analysis, we 
assume P
C I
I >
2
; then A1 implies that, regardless of the value of , all P agents must be 
non-contributory in the initial Nash equilibrium.   
Cn
 Consider a marginal redistribution of nominal income: each rich individual loses 
one dollar, while every non-rich individual gains this amount.  Public good provision must 
fall subsequent to the redistribution, and rich individuals must necessarily become worse 
off.  The tax-transfer policy will reduce the nominal income gap between a rich and a non-
rich individual by $2, while the nominal income gap between any two non-rich individuals 
will stay invariant.  What happens to real income gaps? 
 First consider any pair of non-rich individuals with dissimilar nominal incomes.  By 
Lemma 3.1, the real income gap between these individuals must fall, even though the 
nominal gap stays invariant.  Thus, the marginal redistribution must necessarily reduce real 
inequality within the non-rich segment of the population.  What happens to real inequality 
between the rich and the others?  
 Observation 5.1.  Suppose every C individual loses $1, while every P individual 
gains this amount.  Suppose further that all P individuals remain non-contributory in the 
post-redistribution Nash equilibrium.  Then, in the post-redistribution Nash equilibrium,     
(i) all P individuals must be better off, and 
(ii) there exists ⎥⎦
⎤⎜⎝
⎛∈
2
,0 C
II
?
 such that, if II P
?< , then [for all ( ) PClj ×∈, ,  
must fall by more than $2]. 
jlR
 Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 By Observation 5.1, our example has the following properties.  First, the 
redistribution will benefit the non-rich, despite the fall in public good provision.  Second, if 
the rich are sufficiently richer than the others, the marginal redistribution must necessarily 
reduce the real income gap between a rich and a non-rich individual by more than $2.  
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Hence, in this case, the marginal nominal redistribution will reduce the real income gap 
between any arbitrary pair of individuals with dissimilar nominal incomes by an amount 
greater than the reduction in the corresponding nominal income gap.  It follows that the fall 
in aggregate (absolute) real inequality (as measured by the variance) must be greater than 
that in aggregate nominal inequality.   
 It can also be shown that, if the rich are sufficiently richer than the non-rich, the 
redistribution must increase total real income in the community, despite the fall in public 
good provision.  Thus, a rich person’s real income must fall when expressed as a 
proportion of total (or mean) real income in the community.  It follows that in this case the 
relative income gap between the rich and the poor must also fall, leading to a fall in 
measures of relative inequality of real income.  Furthermore, when non-rich incomes are 
sufficiently low, the redistribution also increases the real income of a non-rich person, 
expressed as a proportion of the real income of a rich person, by more than the 
corresponding change in nominal income.  It follows that, even when inequality is 
measured in relative terms, redistribution may reduce real equality more than it reduces 
nominal inequality. 
 This example shows that philanthropic preferences on part of the rich need not 
necessarily reduce the effectiveness of redistributive measures at the margin.  Indeed, such 
preferences may actually make nominal redistribution more effective, rather than less.  This 
conclusion holds irrespective of whether inequality is measured in absolute or relative 
terms.  The issue therefore becomes an empirical one.    
 
6. Extensions 
 
(i)  Preference heterogeneity: 
We have assumed that preferences are identical across community members.  This is 
primarily for convenience of exposition.  We can generalize the analysis to the case where 
all rich individuals have identical preferences, as do all non-rich individuals, but the 
preferences of the rich differ from those of the non-rich.  Our basic conclusions, as 
summarized in Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.2, will continue to hold for this extension.  
Counterparts of the example presented in Section 5.1 can also be constructed.  If all rich 
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individuals have identical preferences, but preferences vary within the non-rich section, 
then part (i) of Proposition 4.1 need not hold.  However, our conclusions regarding pair-
wise inequality between the rich and the non-rich (Proposition 4.1 ((ii) and (iii)) will 
remain unaffected.   
 
(ii)  Inferior public goods: 
Our conclusions are essentially driven by the assumption that the public good is normal.  If 
the public good is inferior, then, evidently, poorer individuals will benefit more from public 
good provision by the rich.  Hence, philanthropy by the rich would reduce (absolute) real 
inequality.  However, if the public good is inferior, it appears unlikely that the rich would 
contribute towards its provision in the first place.  An exception to this might arise if ability 
to spend on the public good, on part of the poor, is significantly less than their willingness 
to spend, say due to labor or credit market imperfections.  But major labor or credit market 
imperfections would in turn intuitively appear to strengthen the case for strengthening the 
private asset base of poor individuals, (i.e., in effect, provide monetary transfers), not 
weaken it. 
 
(iii)  Private consumption augmenting public goods:   
Our analysis has focused on voluntary provision of public goods that directly improve well-
being, but do not have major income (or private consumption) consequences for non-rich 
individuals.  Religious edifices (e.g. churches and temples), cultural goods (museums, 
concert halls, theatres, artistic performances), ethnic festivals, parks, promenades, 
community centers, sports clubs, sports facilities, etc. all appear to fall in this category.  So 
does aid to foreigners, when one considers the community to consist only of residents of 
the donors’ own country.  Rich philanthropists however often also provide public goods 
that have a significant positive impact on the private earnings of non-rich individuals, or, 
more generally, increase their private consumption.  Cash donations, soup kitchens, 
homeless shelters, donation of clothing or medicine, all provide obvious examples of 
philanthropy that directly add to the private consumption of the poor.   Charitable provision 
of hospitals, educational institutions, water supply, sanitation, irrigation, security, medical 
research, etc. may all significantly increase the earning capacity of the non-rich.  If the 
positive private consumption effect of such philanthropy is larger for poorer individuals, 
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then this may counteract the inequality augmenting effect we have highlighted.  However, 
some of these private income/consumption effects may also further increase inequality.  
The extremely poor are unlikely to study at Oxford on Rhodes Scholarships, crop research, 
irrigation and local security may all benefit landowners much more than the landless, 
medical facilities may be more effective for those who can afford more food.  Thus, for 
these cases, the impact on inequality appears to be ambiguous, depending critically on the 
magnitude and distribution of private benefits that flow from the public good. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
Rich people are frequently advised by thoughtful conservatives to spend their wealth on 
collective goods that benefit sections of the poor.  Bill Gates and Warren Buffet are merely 
the latest in a long line of wealthy individuals to actually end up doing so.  Even politicians 
on the left typically allow large tax incentives for charitable contributions.  In so doing, 
they also appear to endorse the claim that egalitarians should consider philanthropy an 
acceptable substitute for income redistribution.   
 Why should egalitarians do so?  It is well known that, even with public goods 
provision by the rich, there are no a priori grounds for expecting redistribution to 
necessarily make the poor worse off.  Is it then the case that philanthropy itself is likely to 
significantly enhance equality?  Or is it that philanthropy is likely to reduce the 
effectiveness of income-equalizing interventions?  Answers to these questions would 
appear to be of considerable interest in clarifying the trade-offs facing egalitarian policy-
makers. 
 This paper has argued that both answers may be negative.  Using measures of both 
absolute and relative inequality, we have shown that philanthropy may actually exacerbate 
inequality within a community, instead of reducing it.  Thus, an egalitarian should reject 
the claim that philanthropy is necessarily equality-enhancing.  Nor should she admit any a 
priori presumption that philanthropy reduces the efficacy of income redistribution.  From 
an egalitarian perspective, therefore, our analysis appears to weaken the case for permitting 
wealthy philanthropists to opt out of efficient redistribution schemes.  Equality-enhancing 
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claims of specific acts of philanthropy need to be individually established – there should 
not be any indiscriminate presumption in their favor.   
 In particular, as a broad criterion, what appears to be of critical importance in 
assessing such claims is the magnitude of their direct impact on the private asset base of 
poorer individuals, i.e., on their private consumption.  Philanthropic contributions to basic 
health, education, housing and sanitation facilities, medical research into diseases that 
disproportionately affect the poor, and to technologies that improve demand for low-skilled 
labor, seem to generally fall in this category.  Such contributions reach the non-rich, 
directly or indirectly, largely in the form of a significant increment in private consumption, 
and can hence be reasonably perceived as a substitute for redistribution of private 
income.17  Our analysis suggests that, in contrast, philanthropic provision of public goods 
that are intrinsically valuable, but have negligible income-augmenting effects on the non-
rich, may be reasonably viewed as complementary to a policy of redistribution.  Thus, from 
an egalitarian perspective, the case for exempting donations to, say, churches, temples, 
museums, art galleries, opera houses, sports clubs, community centers, public parks, 
universities, elite private schools, private hospitals etc., from taxation appears questionable.  
Automatic presumption of public benefit from all types of charities, a presumption 
common in Western countries both in law and in the public discourse, with its concomitant 
tax implications, appears open to challenge.  Our analysis points to the need for further 
empirical evaluation of this issue in specific policy contexts.18
 Our specification of the public good technology has however been standard — 
individual contributions sum to the total supply of the public good.  As Cornes (1993) has 
analyzed in detail, other specifications overturn many of the standard results in the 
literature. Such alternative specifications will in general have their own implications for the 
                                                 
17  Thus, the publicized priorities of the Gates-Buffet project, or those of George Soros, would appear to be broadly 
in accord when considered globally, but not self-evidently so when considered in the restricted context of, say, American 
society.  Few Americans are likely to experience a significant rise in their private consumption from improvements in 
malaria medicines.  Whether private charitable foundations generally meet these objectives more efficiently than public 
agencies is of course a different question, one on which evidence appears ambiguous. 
18  Charity policy in the U.K., for example, is going through such a rethink.  The British parliament is currently 
debating a new charities bill that removes the automatic presumption of public benefit.  This bill instead requires charities 
to register with a regulator, the Charity Commission, which must, in turn, apply an independent test of public benefit.  
Scotland passed such a law in 2005.  The debate, of course, is over exactly what constitutes ‘public benefit’ that is 
adequate to merit tax concessions (see Leigh (2006)).  Our contribution may be seen as adding to this policy debate.  
Countries such as India currently follow a much more restrictive charity policy, with some public clamour for movement 
towards the Western model. 
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relationship between inequality of incomes and inequality of outcomes.  Investigation of 
these implications is an important task for future research. 
 If the general normative case for exempting rich philanthropists from expropriation 
is indeed as caveat-riddled as our analysis suggests, why do even political parties with 
egalitarian credentials so commonly accept it as a matter of course?  Political-economic 
compulsions of electoral coalition-building may provide a partial explanation.  Elsewhere 
(Dasgupta and Kanbur (2006)) we have examined some aspects of this issue.  Further 
exploration of this theme appears to constitute a useful line of inquiry. 
 
Appendix 
 
 Proof of Lemma 3.1. 
Throughout the proof, we drop the subscript i from the variables , where it is self-
evident.   
iii BxI ,,
 (i) Let  ,( )iyIrr −∗ = θ, ( )∗∗ = rhx  and ( )∗∗ = rgB .  Then, ( ) ( )[ ]∗∗− = BxuyIu i ,,θ .                                           
Noting that the agent is non-contributory, we then have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )iyBxiB yIrrgBxurhBxuyIu i −∗∗∗∗∗∗− −′+′= θθθ ,,,, .                                                 
(X1) 
Since ∗r  is the minimum expenditure required to generate the utility level ( )iyIu −θ, , 
( ) ( )[ ]∗∗∗∗ = BxuBxu Bx ,, , and ( ) ( )[ ]1=′+′ ∗∗ rgrh .  Hence, (X1) yields:                                                             
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( iyBiB yIrBxuyIu i −∗∗− −= θθθ ,,, ) .                                                                                           
(X2) 
Now, A1 implies: 
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Noting that: ⎥⎥⎦
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du | , we then have from (X3): 
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0| <=uuBdB
du
.                                                                                                                                    
(X4) 
Noting that , and that iyB −
∗ < θ ( ]1,0∈θ , we have, from (X4), 
( ) ( )∗∗− < BxuyIu BiB ,,θθ .                                                                                                              
(X5) 
Together, (X2) and (X5) imply: 
 ( ) ( 1,0, ∈−− iy yIr i )θ .                                                                                                                            
(X6) 
Lemma 3.1(i) follows from (3.4) and (X6). 
(ii) By an argument exactly analogous to that used to establish (X6), one can show that: 
( ) 1, >−iI yIr θ .                                                                                                                                  
(X7) 
Lemma 3.1(ii) follows from (3.4) and (X7). 
(iii) Our first step is to establish the following. 
There must exist a positive monotone transformation of u , u~ , such that the indirect 
utility function corresponding to u~  is linear in income.                                                                                
(X8) 
For every positive monotone transformation of u , u~ , such that the indirect utility 
function corresponding to u~  is linear in income, [ 0~ >xBu  and 0~,~ <BBxx uu ].                                             
(X9) 
Let V be the indirect utility function corresponding to u.  Define a transformation of u, 
( )umu ≡~ , by: ( )( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
′=′ rVrVm
α , where α  is some positive constant.  Such a 
transformation must evidently exist.  Since α , 0>′V , 0>′m : thus, u~  is a positive 
monotone of u.  Now let V~  denote the indirect utility function corresponding to u~ .  Since 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ),~ rVrVmrV ′′≡′  by construction, α=′V~ , establishing (X8).  Now consider any 
( )umu ≡~  such that (i) , and (ii) 0>′m ( ) 0~ =′′ rV , where V~  is the indirect utility function 
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corresponding to u~ .  First note that, since ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]rgrhurgrhu Bx ,~,~ = , and [ ]1=′+′ gh , 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]rgrhurgrhurV Bx ,~,~~ ==′ ; hence:     
       huguguhuV BxBBxBxx ′+′=′+′=′′ ~~~~~ .                                                                                           
(X10) 
Suppose 0~ ≤xBu .  Then, by A1, the exact analogue of (X3) for u~  implies 0~,0~ << BBxx uu .  
By (X10) and A1, we then get 0~ <′′V , a contradiction.  Hence: 
0~ >xBu .                                                                                                                                         
(X11) 
Noting 0~ =′′V  by construction, A1, (X10) and (X11) together yield (X9).  
 Now, noting that the real income function is invariant with respect to a positive 
monotonic transformation of the utility function, we have ( ) ( )[ ]∗− = rVyIu i ~,~ θ , implying 
( ) ( )[ ]
iyiB rrVyIu −
∗
− ′= ~,~ θθ .  Hence, noting ,0~ =′′V  
 ( ) ( ) IyiBx irrVyIu −∗− ′= ~,~ θθ .                                                                                                            
(X12) 
 Analogously, 
       ( ) ( ) IIixx rrVyIu ∗− ′= ~,~ θ .                                                                                                                 
(X13) 
Since 0,~ >′ θV ,  (3.4), (X9), (X12) and (X13) together yield part (iii) of Lemma 3.1.                             
 ◊
   
  Proof of Lemma 3.2. 
That y is increasing, and  decreasing, in  follow directly from A1.  Suppose 
.  Then,  .  In light of A1-A2, this implies 
, a contradiction.  Hence .                                                                               
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 Proof of Proposition 4.1. 
(i)  Since, by construction, j and l are both non-contributory, (4.1) reduces to: 
( ) ( )[ ]yIfyIfMR jljljl ,, −+= θ . 
Since , lj II > 0>θ , part (i) follows from Lemma 3.1(ii). 
(ii)  Since, by assumption, l is non-contributory, using (4.1) we get: 
 [ ] ( )[ ]Cljljl yyIfMR −=− ,θ . 
Let ( )[ ] ( CClI nyyIfLtl Γ=−→ ,0 )θ .  Suppose A2 holds.  Then, by Lemma 3.1(i) and Lemma 
3.2,  is increasing in , with .  It follows that there must exist 
 such that  for every .  Noting continuity of f, we get part 
(ii).  The proof for the case [
( CnΓ )
}
Cn ( ) 0>Γ∞→ CC nn
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{ ,...2,1∈∗n ( ) 0>Γ Cn ∗> nnC
( ) ( )0,0,0 uyu = ] is given in part (iii) below. 
(iii)  If  [ ], then ( ) ( 0,0,0 uyu = ) ( )[ ] ( ) 01,
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θθ  for all 
.               ◊  2≥Cn
 
 Proof of Observation 5.1. 
 It can be easily checked that, in the Nash equilibrium, 
 for all , Ci∈ C
CC
C
Ci In
y
n
nIr
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= −11
21 ;                                                                   
(X14) 
 for all Pi∈ , Ci
C
ii II
n
yIr ⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+
== −11
22 .                                                                        
(X15) 
By (X15), the impact of the marginal tax-transfer policy on the real income of a P 
individual is given by:  
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(X16) yields part (i).  Now let Cii II λ≡  for Pi∈ .  Then we can rewrite (X16) as: 
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(X17)  
Since the RHS in (X17) is decreasing in iλ , and approaches infinity as iλ  approaches 0, it 
follows that: 
there must exist ( ) 0>Cnλ  such that 1>⎥⎦
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follows.          ◊  
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